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Deliberation, Deference, and Discretion: Reflections
on Decision Making at the Trial, Appellate, and
Supreme Court
Remarks of Justice Rita B. Garman*
I find that an invitation to speak is often an invitation to study. As I
considered my message for today, I turned to a shelf of books I have
been meaning to finish reading, printed out the requisite three-inch-high
stack of law review articles on judicial decision making, and began to
read. I began with Judge Richard Posner's recent book, How Judges
Think,1 which-in the very first chapter-identifies nine separate
theories of judicial behavior. These theories are descriptive and
necessarily post hoc. Almost immediately, it became clear to me that
while it may be useful for scholars to look back at a generation of
judges and reflect on the influences that shaped their approach to
judging, these descriptive and academically-defined schools of thought
have little relevance to the day-to-day act of judging.
Frankly, I don't know a single attorney who, when called to the
bench by appointment or election, made a conscious decision to
approach the work of judging as a legal formalist, a legal realist, a
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critical legal theorist, or any other "ist." On the other hand, every judge
I have known has made a conscious effort to be aware of the way in
which his or her personal belief system, life experiences, religious faith,
moral values, and other factors might properly or improperly influence
judicial decision making.
As I reflected back on my thirty-five years as a judge and the many
decisions I have made, three themes emerged. At every level of my
judicial experience-the circuit court, the appellate court, and now the
Illinois Supreme Court-the act of judging has been shaped by the
interaction of three things: deliberation, deference, and discretion.
To be deliberate is to be thoughtful, careful, and thorough in decision
making. As a verb, "to deliberate" means to consult with others to
reach a decision. 2 As a circuit court judge in Vermilion County,
Illinois, I made dozens of decisions every day. In the course of a single
trial, I might have made hundreds of decisions, most of which were
entirely routine. However, many of the individual decisions that are
made during a trial have the potential to alter the outcome. These
include motions to suppress evidence, motions in limine, rulings on
discovery issues, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and many more.
I had little time to deliberate because, at the trial court level, judging is
done in "real time," with the attorneys and the parties they represent
waiting for an answer.
With the exception of dispositive motions, such as motions to dismiss
or motions for summary judgment, the trial judge generally does not
have the luxury of taking a matter under advisement or doing extensive
research. And, unlike a typical federal district court judge, most trial
court judges in state courts do not have the assistance of a law clerk.
The state court trial judge, therefore, must rely on the attorneys not only
to frame the individual issues for decision, but to provide relevant
authority and well-reasoned argument. The lesson for the future
litigators in the audience is clear-if you want the trial judge to make a
deliberate decision, you must provide the necessary foundation.
"Deference" is defined in the dictionary as "courteous respect for or
submission to another's opinion, wishes, or judgment." 3 "Discretion" is
the "freedom or power to act on one's own." 4 These two concepts
appear to be opposites. The more deference one must give to others, the
less discretion one has.

2. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 364 (3d ed. 1997).
3. Id. at 361.
4. Id. at 392.
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Paradoxically, while the trial judge is the most limited by the
requirement of deference, he or she also has more discretion than judges
on reviewing courts. The trial judge must defer to the legislature by
enforcing the law as written. The trial judge must also defer to the
factual findings of administrative agencies and to an agency's
legislatively-authorized rule making. And, of course, the trial judge
must defer to the decisions of higher courts.
In Illinois, this means that a circuit judge in Cook County must not
only follow the precedents established by the Illinois Supreme Court,
but also the precedents of the Illinois Appellate Court. Although our
appellate court is divided into five geographic districts, it is a "unitary"
appellate court. That is, a Cook County circuit judge, when faced with
a question that has not yet been decided by the Illinois Supreme Court,
looks first to the decisions of the First Appellate District. If that district
has not yet decided the issue, the Cook County judge must defer to the
precedent set by any other appellate court district in the state. The trial
judge may make his own decision on a matter of law only if no
5
appellate district has ruled on the issue or if the other districts are split.
But even with all of these limits, the trial judge still has the widest
discretion at any level of the judiciary. Many of the individual
decisions that are made during a trial are essentially unreviewable on
appeal, and many of the decisions that are reviewable are subject to the
abuse of discretion standard.
These include evidentiary rulings,
granting or denying a continuance, selection of jury instructions,
imposing a sentence, orders granting or denying a preliminary
injunction, and many others. In addition, the trial court is where equity
resides. The trial judge has the ability to weigh equitable considerations
to a greater degree than judges of reviewing courts. Thus, when I
reached the appellate court in 1995, I found that I had the luxury of
being more deliberate in my decision making and the opportunity to
deliberate with the other justices on the panel. But I had less discretion.
For example, a criminal defendant who is convicted and sentenced
may take an appeal as a matter of right, so long as certain procedural
requirements are met. Similarly, the non-prevailing party in a civil
lawsuit has the right to an appeal. Thus, the appellate court must decide
every case that comes before it. Oral argument is not a matter of right,
however, so this is one area in which the members of the appellate court

5. See ILL. CONST. 1970 art. VI, § 1 (vesting the judicial power in a supreme court, "an" appellate court, and circuit courts); see also People v. Ortiz, 752 N.E.2d 410, 423 (Il1. 2001) ("Although the appellate court is divided into five districts for purposes of election, Illinois has but
one unitary appellate court.").
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do exercise discretion by deciding whether the issues in the case are
such that the court's ability to reach a correct decision would be aided
by granting leave for oral argument.
Another area of discretion in the appellate court is the ability to
decide whether to dispose of a case by means of a published opinion or
a non-published order. The use of non-published orders has been
controversial. It serves the goal of reducing the volume of needlessly
repetitive published opinions, but it is criticized because it gives the
appearance that some opinions might be shielded from public scrutiny.
In my years on the appellate court, I carefully considered whether a
particular opinion added anything at all to the existing body of case law
before designating it to be non-published.
Decision making in the circuit court is an individual endeavor, even
though an older judge might mentor a younger judge or colleagues
might use each other as sounding boards. In the appellate court,
however, decisions are made by panels of three justices. In such a
situation, if you cannot reach agreement with at least one other judge,
you cannot produce an opinion.
The process of reaching agreement is the product of equal parts of
careful legal analysis and collegiality. Collegiality is a form of
deference to one's professional peers and a necessary part of group
deliberation. Fifteen years ago, Frank M. Coffin, the now-retired chief
judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, defined
collegiality as follows:
The deliberately cultivated attitude among judges of equal status and
sometimes widely differing views working in intimate, continuing,
open, and noncompetitive relationship with each other, which manifests respect for the strengths of others, restrains one's pride of authorship, while respecting one's own deepest convictions, values patience
in understanding and compromise in nonessentials, and seeks as much
excellence in the court's decision as the combined talents, experience,
6
insight, and energy of the judges permit.
Collegiality is not an automatic by-product of three individuals
working together-particularly when the three are intelligent,
experienced, confident, and professionally successful individuals who
find themselves together on an appellate court panel. As Judge Coffin
noted, collegiality must be sought and, once achieved, must be nurtured
with patience, respect, and openness.
An appellate justice, like a circuit court judge, is also limited by the
requirement of deference. On questions of constitutional interpretation,
6.

FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 215 (1994).
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the appellate court defers to the United States and Illinois Supreme
Courts. On questions of statutory interpretation, appellate justices defer
not only to the interpretations of higher courts, but also to the intent of
the legislature under the doctrine of separation of powers. It has often
been noted that the doctrine depends not only on judges guarding
against violations by the other co-equal branches of government, but on
their following the doctrine themselves.
Appellate judges must also defer to precedent under the doctrine of
stare decisis, and, unless the standard of review for a particular issue is
de novo, to the findings of the trial judge or the jury. In this
environment, the role of the appellate court is essentially that of error
correction. The appellate court makes precedent, of course, but only as
a by-product of addressing the claims of error raised by the parties. The
challenge for the appellate court is that statutory language and existing
precedents narrow the range of possible outcomes, but do not dictate a
single permissible answer in every case. The legal system must
constantly adapt to new kinds of issues and to unanticipated facts. For
example, who imagined a generation ago that courts would have to deal
with questions of law related to surrogate parents or cyber-crime? The
appellate court is where these decisions are first made.
One of the joys of appellate decision making is the opportunity for
both solitary and collegial deliberation. If oral argument is allowed, the
justices of the appellate court sit in panels of three members to hear oral
argument, then to deliberate in conference, and eventually to decide
each case. If the case is to be decided "on the briefs"-that is, without
oral argument-deliberations take place via memoranda, phone calls,
and circulation of proposed and revised opinions. In addition, each
justice has two clerks to do independent research, assist in the drafting
of opinions, and serve as a deliberative partner.
I remember one of my early cases on the appellate court that involved7
a dispute over the ownership of an abandoned railroad right-of-way.
The State of Illinois Department of Natural Resources wanted to make
the disputed property into a bicycle path. The farmers whose land
adjoined the right-of way wanted to farm the land. The entire dispute
turned on the interpretation of deeds that were over 100 years old to
determine whether the original land owners had conveyed a mere
7. AG Farms, Inc. v. Am. Premier Underwriters, Inc., 695 N.E.2d 882, 890, 892 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998) (holding that circuit court improperly withdrew certification of plaintiff class of landowners who sought only a declaration that, under the original conveyances, the defendant railroad had
no interest to convey after its abandonment of the railroad line; as a result, plaintiffs' claim was a
proper matter for declaratory judgment and the availability of the declaratory remedy for all class
members would avoid piecemeal litigation).
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easement to the now-defunct railroad or had conveyed the land in fee
simple absolute. My clerk and I had the luxury of spending several
days in the library, bringing ourselves up to speed on this narrow aspect
of railroad law. Much of what we learned did not make it into the
written opinion, but did enable me to draft a thoughtful, careful, and
thorough-that is, a deliberate-opinion.
In sum, the appellate court is a place where the justices have limited
discretion, owe a great amount of deference to others, but have both the
ability and the obligation to be deliberate in decision making.
Since 2001, I have had the privilege of serving on the Illinois
Supreme Court. Here, we have the discretion to choose which cases we
will hear in addition to several categories of cases in which appeal to the
state's highest court is a matter of right. Cases are selected, not because
of the need for mere error correction, but because they present questions
of law in need of resolution.
We owe deference to the constitutions of the United States and the
State of Illinois, to relevant decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, and-to a lesser degree-to our own prior decisions under the
doctrine of stare decisis. On questions of statutory interpretation, we
owe deference to the clearly expressed intent of the legislature.
Otherwise, state supreme court justices are not limited by the need to
defer to the logic, analysis, or conclusions of others.
The state supreme court is the most deliberative judicial body.
Because there are seven justices who must decide every case and
because we work together for a long time (we serve ten-year terms),
collegiality is crucial.
I am occasionally asked by non-lawyers whether appellate justices
"trade" votes-that is, whether we bargain with each other, swapping
one person's vote for the proposed opinion in Smith v. Jones for the
other person's vote on People v. John Doe. I suppose this impression
comes from movies or television, or the sense that group decision
making by its very nature must involve some degree of "you scratch my
back and I'll scratch yours." They seem surprised when I tell them that
I have never been asked to trade my vote for another justice's vote and
that I have never seen or heard of this happening among my colleagues.
What does happen is that we choose our battles. We learn, in Judge
Coffin's words, to "compromise in nonessentials." 8 The author of an
opinion may be willing to revise a particular passage, or to omit a
particular statement, if it is important to a colleague. My colleagues

8. See COFFIN, supra note 6, at 215.
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know, for example, that I am a bit "picky" when it comes to the use of
the term "jurisdiction." In my writing, I try to use the term only to refer
to subject matter or personal jurisdiction. I think it is confusing to the
bench and bar when the term is used in its more general sense to mean a
court's mere authority or ability to act. I may ask a colleague to
rephrase a passage that uses the word "jurisdiction" in this more general
sense. Similarly, I am aware of my colleagues' preferences and I try to
accommodate them when drfting a proposed opinion. I have learned,
for example, to use the terms "waiver" and "forfeiture" with precision,
because if I do not, I will be reminded of the distinction.
When an opinion is not unanimously adopted, collegiality also
requires that each of the seven members of the court consider whether
he or she might be wrong. When a vote is taken and I find myself in the
minority, I ask myself whether I might be mistaken. When I am the
author of an opinion and one of my colleagues finds it necessary to
write separately, I consider whether he or she is making points in
concurrence that I should incorporate into the opinion or raising
questions in dissent that should cause me to reconsider my conclusions.
I began my remarks today by suggesting that in the day-to-day work
of judging in the Illinois courts, the judges are not likely to subscribe to
a particular school of judicial thought or to embrace a particular
philosophy of judging. Here I will depart from that broad statement. At
the state supreme court level, the justices are quite aware that-in the9
words of Professor Cass Sunstein-we decide "one case at a time."
We judge incrementally, making a conscious effort to leave for another
day those questions that need not and should not be answered in the
present case.
I do not expect the students in the audience to be familiar with many
decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court, so I will give an example of
incremental decision making from the United States Supreme Court. In
2004, Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Crawford v.
Washington, which held that the admission of a testimonial out-of-court
statement against a criminal defendant violates the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment unless the defendant has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at trial or has had that
opportunity in a prior proceeding.' 0 The opinion did not define the term
"testimonial," except to conclude that Sylvia Crawford's formal written
statement, made while she was in custody and being interrogated by the
9.

CASS R. SUNSTEIN,

ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME

COURT (Harv. Univ. Press 1999).
10. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
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police after receiving Miranda warnings, was indeed testimonial. A
footnote acknowledged that the Court's "refusal to articulate a
comprehensive definition [of the term] in this case will cause interim
uncertainty." I I
And it did! It took only until 2006 for the question to reach the Court
again in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v.
Indiana.12 The Court determined in those combined cases that
statements made during a 9-1-1 call for emergency assistance were not
testimonial, but that statements made to a police officer investigating a
13
possible crime were testimonial.
Davis and Hammon will not be the final word on the definition of
"testimonial" in the context of Confrontation Clause claims. It is the
nature of our legal system that no single case is ever the final word on
anything. Indeed, Crawford itself overturned the 1980 decision in Ohio
v. Roberts,14 which appeared, at the time, to be the definitive guide to
applying the Confrontation Clause.
The Roberts, Crawford, Davis, and Hammon decisions illustrate the
fundamental difference between the legislature's enactment of a statute
and a court's announcement of a judge-made rule. The legislature
attempts-with mixed success-to write a law that accounts for all of
the variables and contingencies that may exist with regard to the subject
matter. Judicial decisions, in contrast, are most legitimate and effective
when they decide the precise issues raised by the facts and the law in
the individual case before the court and leave for another day the
questions that have not yet been, and may never be, squarely presented.
In conclusion, I hope that my account of one working judge's
thoughts on judicial decision making have been informative and
interesting. I approach the day-to-day work of judging one case at a
time-mindful of the deference I owe to others, the duty to be deliberate
and collegial, and the responsibility to exercise discretion with care.

11. Id. at 68 n.10.
12. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
13. Id. at 826-27.
14. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (finding that hearsay evidence is not barred by the
Confrontation Clause if it demonstrates adequate indicia of reliability).

